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 Chapter 9 
 THE BADNESS OF 
DEATH AND THE 
GOODNESS OF LIFE 
 john  broome 
 What harm does death do you? To put the question differently: when you die, 
what do you lose by dying? To put it differently again: when you do not die, what 
do you gain by continuing to live? The question of what harm death does you is the 
same as the question of what good is done you by living. It is the question of the 
goodness of your life. 
 Two extreme answers can be given. One is “everything”; we might think that, 
for you, your life is everything, and by dying you lose everything. Another is “noth-
ing”; we might think that you lose nothing by dying. I shall start by rejecting these 
extreme answers. Then I shall go on to the moderate, quantitative answer that I 
favor. 
 1.  Do You Lose Nothing by Dying? 
 I shall take the “nothing” answer first. Epicurus may be read as giving this answer. 
He says:
 Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil 
consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. . . . So death, the most 
terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist death is not with us; but 
when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living 
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or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more. (Epicurus, 
1926, pp. 30–31) 
 Epicurus seems to be saying that death does you no harm. If this is right, it fol-
lows that continuing to live does you no good. 
 Most of us find the “nothing” answer implausible because we take it for granted 
that dying would be a terrible thing to happen to us. Epicurus himself may not 
mean to give this answer. When he says “death is nothing to us,” he may not mean 
that death does us no harm—I shall come to that. Nevertheless, his argument does 
supply materials that can be used to construct a case for the “nothing” answer. I 
shall lay out this case and try to make it persuasive despite its initial implausibility. 
But in the end I shall argue that it fails. 
 The beginning of the case is to recognize that the goodness of life has two 
dimensions: its quality and its quantity. It is quite easy to slip into thinking that the 
quantity of life does not matter at all; only its quality matters. This is exactly what 
most of us think about the goodness of life in another context. One way of adding 
to the quantity of life in the world is by having more babies; that way, more life is 
lived in total. But most of us do not favor increasing the quantity of life this way. 
We favor increasing the quality of life of the people who live, but we do not favor 
increasing the number of people who live. When the Chinese government insti-
tuted its one-child policy, its aim was to increase the quality of life of the Chinese. 
The policy also decreases the quantity of Chinese life: there are fewer Chinese now 
than there would have been without the policy. But the government did not think 
of this reduction in quantity as a bad thing, to be set against the increase in quality. 
Most of us would have agreed. 
 Moreover, this attitude we commonly have to the number of people can be sup-
ported by an argument. Suppose a couple are thinking of having a child, but even-
tually decide not to. As a result of their decision there is less life in the world than 
there would have been had they decided differently. Is this reduction in quantity 
a bad thing? Well, no one is harmed by it. No one is harmed by not being brought 
into existence. It is not as though there is some child who suffers the misfortune 
of not existing. There is simply no child, so no one is harmed. Consequently, we 
might plausibly think no harm is done. We might conclude it cannot be a bad thing 
to reduce the quantity of life in this way. 
 This argument needs to be qualified. Perhaps some people will be worse off 
as a result of the child’s nonexistence. Perhaps her potential parents will come to 
regret having no child, and perhaps the child would have grown up to make a 
great contribution to civilization. So perhaps some people will be harmed by her 
nonexistence. But these are indirect effects, and to keep the argument sharp, let 
us assume them away. Let us assume there are no indirect effects of this sort, even 
though in practice there will almost certainly be some. Under this assumption, the 
argument has some force. 
 Now back to our context, which is extending life rather than creating life. 
Bringing more people into the world is one way of increasing the quantity of life. 
Another is to extend the lives of people who are already in the world. Epicurus 
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shows us that we can take the same attitude to quantity in this context too, and 
there is a parallel argument for thinking that quantity has no value. We can ask a 
parallel question about the quantity of a single person’s life. Previously we asked 
who is harmed by not being created; now let us ask at what time a person is harmed 
by not continuing to live. Suppose you might have lived longer, but you actually 
die now. Is that a bad thing for you? Well, there is no time when you are harmed 
by your early death. As Epicurus says, you are not harmed at any time before your 
death, since so long as you exist “death is not with [you].” And you are not harmed 
at any time after your death, since at no time after your death do you exist. Since 
there is no time when you are harmed by your death, we might conclude your 
death is not a bad thing for you. In the same way, the previous argument concluded 
that, since there is no one who is harmed when a couple declines to have a child, 
they do nothing bad in acting as they do. 
 In response, you may say there is indeed a time when death harms you: the 
time when you die. In saying this, you could be making either of two points. The 
first is that the process of dying is often dreadful. That is obviously true, and it does 
mean that your death harms you in one way. But it is not relevant to the question I 
am asking. I am asking what is the benefit to you of continuing to live. Conversely, 
what harm would be done you by not continuing to live? What harm would be 
done you by having your life cut short? I sometimes express this question in the 
form: what harm does your death do you? This is a graphic but not entirely accu-
rate way of putting the question of what harm would be done you by having your 
life cut short. The terribleness of the process of dying is not a part of the answer 
to this question. Cutting your life short does not necessarily harm you in this way, 
because your dying may be dreadful whether it occurs at the end of a long life or a 
short one. So we can set aside this aspect of the badness of death. 
 The second point you might be making is this. If death harms you, it is obvious 
when the harm is done. It is done at the time of your death, since your death does 
the harm. This is true too, but it is also not relevant to the question I am asking. We 
must distinguish the time when a harm is caused from the time when it is suffered. 
If I drop a banana skin on the road, and you later slip on it and hurt yourself, we 
may say your harm is caused when I drop the banana skin. But it is suffered when 
you fall. Epicurus is interested in the time when the harm of death is suffered, not 
when it is caused. His conclusion is that it is not suffered at any time. If there were 
any harm, it would be caused at the time you die, but that is another matter. We 
can set aside this point too. 
 Once those two points are set aside, I think we should agree that there is no time 
when death harms you. That is a truth we should learn from Epicurus. Epicurus 
apparently draws the conclusion that, because there is no time when death harms 
you, it does not harm you at all. But to reach that conclusion, we have to make the 
further assumption that an event cannot harm you unless it harms you at some 
time. Is that a good assumption? 
 Once again, Epicurus supplies us with material that at first seems to support it. 
He says that “all good and evil consists in sensation.” He means that the only sort of 
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good that can come to us is a good sensation, and the only sort of bad is a bad sen-
sation. This is a version of what is nowadays called “hedonism.” It is highly conten-
tious, and one way of responding to Epicurus is to deny it. 1 But denying hedonism 
is also contentious, and for my purposes I do not need to deny it. Instead, I shall 
show that, even if we grant Epicurus’s hedonism, it does not truly support the claim 
that you cannot be harmed unless you are harmed at some particular time. 
 So let us assume like Epicurus that all good and evil consists in sensation. Since 
all sensations occur at particular times, we can quickly conclude that all goods and 
evils occur at particular times. So the goodness or badness of your life is made up 
of good and bad things, all of which occur at particular times in your life. This is a 
consequence of hedonism. 
 But the notions of  benefit and  harm are different from the notions of  good 
and  bad , and just because all goods and bads occur at particular times, it does not 
follow that all benefits and harms do.  Benefit and  harm are comparative notions. 
Normally, if something benefits you, it makes your life better than it would have 
been, and if something harms you it makes your life worse than it would have been. 
“Better” and “worse” are the comparatives of “good” and “bad,” respectively. A 
comparison is between two things. To determine whether some event benefits or 
harms you, we have to compare the goodness of your life as it is, given the event, 
with the goodness it would otherwise have had. The comparison is between your 
whole life as it is and your whole life as it would have been. We do not have to make 
the comparison time by time, comparing each particular time in one life with the 
same time in the other life. So even if the goodness of your life is made up of good 
and bad things that all occur at particular times, there is no need for the compar-
ison between lives to be made up of benefits and harms that can all be tied down 
to particular times. 
 Take an analogy. Suppose the text of a book is shortened before it is published: 
the last chapter is cut out. The book is shortened by six thousand words, but all the 
earlier chapters are left intact. Then six thousand words are cut from the book; yet 
no words are cut from any page in the book. This is so even though every word in 
the book appears on a particular page. Moreover, had the book been published in 
the longer, uncut version, every word in the longer book would have appeared on 
a particular page. The number of words cut from the book is determined by com-
paring the whole book as it is, with the whole book as it would have been had it not 
been shortened. It is not determined by comparing any particular page with that 
same page as it would have been. 
 Similarly, death may harm you by shortening your life, even though there is 
no time when it harms you. To determine whether it harms you, we compare the 
goodness of the shorter life you have, taken as a whole, with the goodness of the 
longer life you would have had, taken as a whole. If we believe Epicurus’s hedon-
ism, the goodness of the shorter life is made up of the good and bad sensations that 
occur within it. The goodness of the longer life includes all those sensations too, 
and it also includes all the good and bad sensations you would have had in later 
life had you not died. If your life is going well, presumably these extra sensations 
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would have been predominantly good ones. So the longer life would have been 
better than the shorter one. You are therefore harmed by the shortening of your 
life. But there is no time when you suffer this harm, just as, when the book is short-
ened, no page in the book loses any words. Epicurus’s hedonism actually implies 
that death normally harms you. Epicurus thinks it implies the opposite, but he is 
making a mistake. 
 Go back briefly to the analogous argument about the world’s population. It 
fails for the same reason. The question is whether a couple’s decision not to have a 
child is a bad thing. To answer, we must compare the goodness of the world with-
out the child with the goodness it would have had if the child had existed. The 
world might be better without the child, or worse, or equally good. In particular, 
it might be worse, even though there is no one for whom it is worse. Again: a book 
can be shorter than it would have been, even though no page has any fewer words. 
 The argument I took from Epicurus fails. Epicurus is right that there is no time 
when death harms you. But even granted hedonism, it does not follow that death 
does not harm you. It may harm you, even though it harms you at no time. 
 2.  Should We Mind about Dying? 
 I took the argument from Epicurus, but Epicurus may not mean to argue that 
death does not harm you. By “death is nothing to us,” he may mean simply that you 
should not mind about dying. It is possible that you should not mind about dying 
even though your dying will harm you. Perhaps that is what Epicurus thinks. 
 How could it be so? If dying will harm you, surely you should mind about it. 
Not necessarily. It depends on what you should care about. Dying will harm you, 
but possibly you should not care about what happens to you, yourself. You are a 
person, with a life that extends from when you come into existence to when you go 
out of existence. Caring about what happens to you involves caring about the whole 
of that life. But why should you care about that? For instance, as an alternative, why 
should you not care just about what happens to you in the present? What you care 
about may change from time to time. Why should you not, at each particular time, 
care about just what happens to you at that particular time? 
 This needs to be put carefully. Probably you anyway care about what happens 
to other people besides yourself. But you probably care in a different way about 
what happens to you yourself. Call this sort of care “self-care.” The suggestion is 
that you should attach your self-care, not to what happens to the person you are, 
with the whole of your life, but just to what happens to you in the present. 
 Wittgenstein uses the expression “living in the present,” and I think this is 
what he means by it. He points out: “For life in the present there is no death. Death 
is not an event in life” (1961, p. 75). He is saying that, so long as you care only about 
what happens to you in the present, rather than about yourself as a whole, you will 
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never encounter death among the things you care about. Your death does not occur 
during your life, so for you it is never in the present. 
 Possibly Epicurus is making a similar point. Since there is no time when death 
harms you, death does not harm you in the present, whatever time happens to be 
the present. So if you should care only about what happens to you in the present, 
you will never have any reason to mind about dying. 
 I am here not concerned with the correct interpretation of Epicurus. I am 
interested in how good it is for you to continue living. This is a question about 
the good of you, the person you are, who has a whole life. It is not about what you 
should care about at any particular time. The question is whether dying—ceasing 
to live—harms you. I asked whether we could find in Epicurus’s remarks any rea-
son for thinking it does not. His remarks provide the materials for an argument, 
but in the end the argument fails. 
 3.  Do You Lose Everything by Dying? 
 Now I come to the opposite extreme answer to the question “what do you lose by 
dying?”: the answer that you lose everything. 
 Here is an argument that supports this answer: after you die you will not have 
anything, so in dying you will lose everything. But this argument is invalid. Its 
premise is true: after you die, indeed you will not have anything. But it is true only 
in a peculiar way, and in this peculiar way it does not support the conclusion that 
in dying you will lose everything. I shall explain why not. 
 The sentence “you will not have anything” can be true in two different ways. 
One is when you exist and do not have anything. In this case, the negation con-
tained in the sentence is often called “internal,” because it negates the sentence’s 
predicate. The sentence may be parsed “you will (not have anything).” The other 
way is when you do not exist. The negation is then “external” because it negates the 
sentence as a whole. The sentence can only be understood as meaning “it is not the 
case that you will have something.” (A little point of English that may be confusing: 
in our context, “anything” replaces “something” under negation.) 
 The premise of the argument—that after you die you will not have anything—
is true in this second way and not the first. This is what I called the “peculiar” way 
of being true. In the same peculiar way it is true that Pegasus—a winged horse—
has no wings, because he does not exist. In the same way, too, it is true that Nelson 
now has no left arm; it is true because, being dead, Nelson now does not exist. 
 An external negation does not support the claim that something is lost. Think 
some more about Nelson’s arms. Before he attacked Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Nelson 
had a right arm. Afterward he did not. The negation here is internal: after the 
attack, Nelson did (not have a right arm). Because the negation is internal, we may 
correctly draw the conclusion that Nelson lost his right arm in the attack. His 
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loss consisted in the difference between two states of Nelson: the previous state in 
which he had a right arm and the subsequent state in which he did not. So an inter-
nal negation makes loss possible. 
 Compare what happened at the Battle of Trafalgar, when Nelson died. Before 
the battle, Nelson had a left arm. Afterward he did not. But in this case the nega-
tion is external. After the battle, it was not the case that Nelson had a left arm, but it 
is not correct to say that he did (not have a left arm), since he did not exist. Because 
the negation is external, we cannot correctly conclude that Nelson lost his left arm 
at Trafalgar. There is no comparison to be made between a previous state of Nelson 
in which he had a left arm and a subsequent state in which he did not, since subse-
quently there was no Nelson. 
 There were indeed two states of Nelson’s body: a state previous to the battle 
and a state subsequent to it. This means the body could have lost its left arm. As it 
happens, it did not; the arm remained attached to the body. In any case, whatever 
happened to his body, Nelson himself did not lose an arm at Trafalgar. 
 In the same way, there is no comparison to be made between your state before 
you die and your state after you die. From the premise that after you die you will 
not have anything, with its external negation, we cannot correctly conclude that 
you lose everything by dying. The argument I have been discussing purports to 
make a temporal comparison between what you have before your death and what 
you have after it. The argument fails because there is no real temporal comparison 
to be made. 
 To determine what you lose as a result of a particular event, we do have to 
make a comparison. But there are two sorts of comparison we might make, and 
two corresponding sorts of loss. One comparison is temporal. We compare what 
you have after the event with what you had before it. If you have less afterward, you 
have suffered a temporal loss. We can only make a temporal comparison like this if 
you exist both before and after the event. When the event is your death, you do not 
exist afterward. Therefore, your death cannot cause you temporal loss. 
 I admit we say that, at your death, you lose your life, and this loss is plainly 
meant to be temporal. But this is a unique idiom; we do not commonly say that, at 
your death, you lose other things besides your life. When a husband dies, we say his 
wife loses her husband, but we do not say the husband loses his wife. We recognize 
that would be false. We should also recognize that, although idiomatic, it is strictly 
false to say that the husband loses his life. 
 The other sort of comparison we may make is atemporal, and yields an atem-
poral sort of loss. This sort of comparison does not require you to exist both before 
and after the event that causes the loss. When we ask what you lose by dying, we do 
not have to answer the question by comparing what you have after your death with 
what you have before it. We can instead compare what you have, given that you die 
at a particular time, with what you would have had if you had not died then. When 
we think this way, “what you have” does not refer to what you have at a particular 
time, but to what you have atemporally, taking your whole life together. What you 
lose by dying, understood this way, is not everything. It is just a part of the longer 
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life you would have led, had you not died when you do. What you lose by dying is 
not your life, but only the rest of your life. 
 Our question is “what do you lose by dying?” The incorrect answer “every-
thing” encourages the idea that living is infinitely good for you. But no one should 
believe that. No one’s life is infinitely good. How could it be? Dying shortens your 
life by only a finite length of time. Our human lives are only finite in length, and 
during them we can experience and achieve only a finite number of things. 
 The only way to answer the question correctly is to understand it atempo-
rally. What you lose by dying is the finite difference between a longer life and a 
shorter one. This answer lies between the extremes of “everything” and “nothing,” 
or between “infinity” and “zero.” It is “something.” 
 4.  How Much Do You Lose by Dying? 
A Practical Question 
 But “something” is not a good enough answer; we need to know how much. 
Excluding the two extremes puts us in the domain of quantities. I have said that 
what you lose by dying is the rest of your life. I now turn to assessing what you lose 
in quantitative terms. More exactly, I turn to assessing the value to you of what you 
lose. How bad for you is your loss? I said that what you lose is the rest of your life; 
how bad is that? Put differently, how good for you is the rest of your life? 
 We should not expect all deaths to be equally bad; some people lose more by 
their deaths than others do. Indeed, some unfortunate people benefit from their 
deaths. I shall continue to write of the badness of death, but I mean to allow for 
the possibility that some deaths are good, which is to say that they have negative 
badness. 
 The badness for you of your death is the difference between the goodness of 
the longer life you would have led had you continued living and the goodness of the 
life you actually do lead. In general, the badness of death is the difference between 
the goodness of a longer life and the goodness of a shorter one. (In some cases this 
difference may be negative.) So, to assess the badness of a particular death, we need 
first to work out what life is led by the person who dies and what life she would 
have led had she continued living. Then, second, we need to judge the goodness of 
those two lives. 
 The first task is partly empirical and partly a matter of evaluating the counter-
factual notion of “the life the person would have led.” Some writers on death give 
space to evaluating this counterfactual, 2 but I shall not. One reason is that it is not 
particularly a problem for the philosophy of death; it is a problem of counterfactu-
als in general. Another reason is that the counterfactual is not important in prac-
tice, as I shall soon explain. 
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 In the rest of this chapter, I shall therefore concentrate on the second task, of 
judging the goodness of lives. The task of judging the badness of death transmutes 
into this task of judging the goodness of lives. We have to compare the goodness of 
a longer life with the goodness of a shorter one. 
 I have described this difference as the goodness of the rest of your life. This is 
correct in one sense: it is the amount of good that the rest of your life would bring 
you if you lived it. But it is not necessarily the amount of good that you would enjoy 
during the rest of your life. The goodness of your life may be determined holisti-
cally, in a way that involves interactions among different parts of it. So the rest of 
your life may benefit you in some way that is not simply by being good in itself. It 
may add good to earlier parts of your life, or it may contribute in other ways to the 
goodness of your life as a whole. There will be examples in section 5. 
 Why do we need to do this quantitative work? Because in practice important 
decisions hang on it. Life and death decisions are constantly being made—I mean 
decisions that affect the lengths of people’s lives. Some are on a small, individ-
ual scale; others on the scale of the whole world. On a small scale, all of us regu-
larly make decisions that shorten or lengthen our lives. Statistically, each doughnut 
shortens your life. Is it worth it? That is probably something you do not want to 
think about. But in other cases, you will want to make the calculation. If you have 
a terminal illness, you will need to decide at what point to give up aggressive treat-
ment aimed at prolonging your life, and accept only palliative care till you die. You 
may think carefully about that. Your decision may depend on your judgment of the 
goodness of extending your life—for instance, on whether you have a work of art to 
finish and on whether you expect to lose your capacities. 
 You will be weighing the quantity of your life against its quality. You may need 
to do this for yourself explicitly only in rare and tragic circumstances. But when 
the decision is for other people, you will need to be more careful. You can be cava-
lier about your own doughnuts, but not about other people’s lives. 
 Governments in particular make decisions that lengthen or shorten many 
people’s lives, so they need to judge the goodness of those lives. Governments often 
have to weigh some people’s lives against others. They also often have to weigh the 
quantity of lives against the quality of lives. Take the provision of health care. Some 
treatments (such as hip replacements) improve the quality of people’s lives without 
extending them. Some (such as heart replacements) extend lives. Many govern-
ments explicitly or implicitly set priorities among different sorts of treatment. To 
do so properly, they must weigh the quality of life against the quantity of life. They 
need to assess the goodness of people’s lives. 
 On a much larger scale, we must decide what to do about global warming. One 
of the greatest harms that global warming will do is to kill huge numbers of peo-
ple. It will kill them in floods and famines and in heat waves; it will kill them by 
extending the range of tropical diseases; and it will kill them in marginal areas of 
the world by making them poorer—poverty is a killer. By reducing our emissions of 
greenhouse gases, we can reduce the number of people who will be killed. But to do 
that we shall have to sacrifice some of the quality of our own lives. What sacrifices 
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should we make? What reduction in the quality of our lives in the present is worth-
while for the sake of extending the quantity of people’s lives in the future? Again, we 
need to assess the goodness of people’s lives, and weigh quality against quantity. 
 So the practical need for judging the goodness of lives is as an input into deci-
sion making. I am not suggesting that goodness is the only input. Fairness in the 
distribution of goods also matters, particularly in making public decisions that 
influence which people die and which survive. But goodness is one input. 
 Decision making is a matter of choosing among a number of options. Each 
option will lead to a particular state of the world. But we never know exactly what 
state will result from the option we choose; the results are always uncertain to some 
degree. To judge the goodness of each option we therefore have to take account 
of its uncertainty. Expected utility theory tells us the correct way of doing so. In 
principle, we must assess the goodness of each state of the world that might result 
from the option, and calculate a weighted average of those goodnesses, in the way 
expected utility theory tells us to. The details of the method do not matter here. 
 For example, suppose you are deciding whether to reject or accept aggressive 
treatment for your terminal disease. If you reject it, you will die after some time, 
which is uncertain, and your life till that time will have some quality, which is also 
uncertain. If you accept aggressive treatment, you will die after some time that is 
probably longer, and your life till that time will have some quality that is probably 
less good. You should assess the goodness of each possible result of each option, 
and compare the weighted average goodness of the possible results of one option 
with the weighted average goodness of the possible results of the other. 
 None of this requires you to evaluate the counterfactual notion of “the life you 
would have led” had you decided differently. For practical purposes, you do not 
need to evaluate this counterfactual. You do not need to assess the badness of your 
death in a way that involves it. So it is not needed for practical purposes. That is the 
main reason why I do not give space to it. 
 5.  Theories of the Goodness of Lives 
 The goodness of lives determines how bad it is to die; the question of how bad 
death is transmutes into the question of how good life is. So how good is a life? I 
am sorry to say this is too difficult a question for me to answer here. It is one of the 
topics of my book  Weighing Lives , and even there I was able to offer only a “default 
theory” of the goodness of lives (2004, chs. 15–17). I meant a theory that it is reason-
able to hold so long as there are no good arguments against it. A very large range of 
theories are available and, in the present state of discussion, choosing among them 
is generally more a matter of intuition than argument. Here, I shall survey part of 
the range, and provide a partial taxonomy of it. I shall give just a few examples of 
the theories that are available. I shall not try to adjudicate between them. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 08/02/12, NEWGEN
10_Bradley_Ch09.indd   227 8/2/2012   12:11:12 AM
 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEATH
 Two clarifications are needed at the start. One is about the tightness of the 
scale of goodness we should aim at. The simplest aim would be just to put lives in 
the order of their goodness—to determine which lives are better than which. That 
would be enough to answer the most basic question about the value of a person’s 
death: is it good or bad? It is good if the shorter life the person leads is better than 
the longer one she would have led, and bad if the shorter life is worse. 
 But for practical decision making we need more than this. Because the results 
of a decision are always uncertain, we need to apply expected utility theory. That 
requires us to have a cardinal scale for goodness, including the goodness of lives. 
So in valuing lives, we need to aim for a cardinal scale. 
 I do not say we can expect to get one. Indeed, it seems unreasonable to expect 
even a determinate ordering of lives by their goodness. It seems likely that there is 
sometimes no determinate answer to the question of whether it would be a good or 
a bad thing to prolong a particular life, at some cost in its quality. We should surely 
expect a lot of incommensurability in assessing the goodness of lives. But I shall 
have to leave aside the question of how this incommensurability should be dealt 
with. The theories I shall mention ignore it. But this does not vitiate their value, 
because there may well be ways of extending them to take incommensurability into 
account. 3 
 A second clarification is that I am dealing with the goodness of lives for the 
person who lives them; I call this their “personal goodness.” The question is how 
good it is for a person to live a particular life. We could also ask how good it is 
simpliciter, rather than for the person, that a person lives a particular life. This is 
a question of “general goodness,” as I call it. It is not the topic of this chapter. As 
it happens, I think personal goodness generates general goodness: 4 if one life  A is 
better for the person who lives it than another  B , it is better simpliciter that this 
person lives life  A than that she lives life  B . But that assumption plays no part in 
this chapter. 
 Theories of the goodness of lives range from very particular ones to ones that 
have a lot of formal structure. One example of a very particular theory is that the 
only thing that makes a life good for a person is the excellence she achieves, so the 
goodness of a life is the amount of excellence it contains. I shall concentrate on 
more structured theories. 
 5.1 Distributed Th eories 
 More structured theories can be developed if we make what I shall call the assump-
tion of “distribution.” It is the assumption that the goodness of a life is distributed 
across times. Put another way, it is the assumption that the goodness of a life is 
made up of its goodness at all times. It is really a combination of two assumptions. 
First, that there is such a thing as the goodness of a life at particular times—I shall 
call this “temporal goodness” and contrast it with the “lifetime goodness” of a 
life as a whole. Second, that the goodness of the life supervenes on its goodness at 
times. In mathematical terms, it is a function of its goodnesses at times. 
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 It will be helpful to express this assumption in symbols. For convenience, I 
shall imagine that times are discrete. The assumption of distribution is that life-
time goodness  G is given by the formula: 
 G =  G ( g 1 ,  g 2 ,  g 3 , . . .  g  n  ). 
 The indices 1 . . .  n denote a sequence of times, and  g 1 ,  g 2 ,  g 3 , . . .  g  n  are the temporal 
goodnesses of the life at those times. I call  G () the “goodness function.” Let us call 
a theory of goodness “distributed” if it satisfies the assumption of distribution. 
Different distributed theories disagree about the form of the goodness function. 
 The assumption of distribution does not specify the scale on which temporal 
goodness is measured. Different views about the goodness function require differ-
ent scales, as will appear. 
 You might well reject the assumption of distribution. You might think there 
are good features of a life that cannot be assigned to particular times. I have already 
mentioned the theory of goodness as excellence. You might hold this theory and 
also think that the excellence of a life cannot always be assigned to particular times. 
For another example, there is the view that the lifetime goodness of a life depends 
on its degree of internal coherence in some way that is not reflected in its sequence 
of temporal goodnesses. Perhaps a life is better if it is directed toward one particu-
lar broad aim, rather than toward an eclectic mixture of aims. It might not be pos-
sible to allocate this good feature of the life to any particular times within the life. 
 Still, the assumption of distribution is not very restrictive. It leaves room for 
very many different distributed theories. It even allows a life to have temporal good-
ness at times outside the boundaries of the life; it does not rule out posthumous or 
antenatal goods and bads. However, for the sake of convenience in what follows, 
I shall assume that all the temporal goodness of a life occurs within its tempo-
ral boundaries. So in the formula above, I shall assume that the times indexed by 
1 . . .  n constitute the sequence of successive times within the life. It would take only 
minor adjustments to remove this assumption. 
 The assumption of distribution leaves it open how temporal goodness is deter-
mined. The nature of well-being is a large and hotly debated subject, and much of 
this debate is about temporal goodness. Does your good at a time consist in your 
experiences at the time, as Epicurus assumed, or in the satisfaction of the prefer-
ences you have at the time, or in something else? All of this is left open by the 
assumption of distribution, and it is left open by all the distributed theories I shall 
mention in this section. These are theories about how a person’s good at particular 
times comes together to determine her lifetime good. They are not theories about 
the nature of her good at particular times. 
 In particular, the assumption of distribution does not require temporal good-
ness at a time to be determined only by events that happen at that time. Indeed, it is 
implausible that it would be, unless events are construed very broadly. Suppose, say, 
that you work hard on a project, and the project is later successful. We might think 
that your later success adds to the goodness of the earlier times when you work hard 
on it; it might cause a change in the goodness of those earlier times. This would be 
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a sort of backwards causation of goodness, and it is perfectly compatible with the 
assumption of distribution. I mentioned in section 4 that, were your life threatened 
at some time, but you survive, the rest of your life might benefit you by adding value 
to earlier parts of your life. If that is so, it is another example of backward causation 
of goodness, and it is compatible with the assumption of distribution. 
 5.2 Additively Separable Th eories 
 A vast range of forms are possible for the goodness function. The one that may first 
spring to mind is simple addition, which makes a life’s lifetime goodness the total 
of the goodness of its times. Call this the “total theory”: 
 G =  g 1 +  g 2 +  g 3 + . . . +  g  n  . 
 It demands a tight scale for measuring temporal goodness: the scale must be cardinal. 
Furthermore, goodness at each time must be comparable with goodness at other times. 
Furthermore again, the scale must have a fixed zero, which means it is a ratio scale. 
This is because we need to compare the lifetime goodnesses of lives of different lengths. 
Take a life of some length, and imagine shortening it by removing the last time in it. 
Imagine the person dies one time earlier, that is to say. According to the total theory, 
the shorter life is worse than the longer one if and only if the goodness of that last time 
is above zero. So the level of the zero makes a difference to the ordering of lives. 
 The total theory belongs to a class of distributed theories that may be called 
“additively separable.” The characteristic of additively separable theories is that 
they treat the goodness of a life as the sum of values, each of which is assigned to a 
particular time and is a function of the temporal goodness of that time. The value 
assigned to a time must be independent of the goodness of other times, and of the 
length  n of the life. Put roughly, each time can be valued independently of other 
times. The general formula of an additively separable theory is: 
 G =  v 1 ( g 1 ) +  v 2 ( g 2 ) +  v 3 ( g 3 ) + . . . +  v  n  ( g  n  ). 
 I shall call  v 1 (),  v 2 () and so on the “temporal value functions.” The form of these 
functions is independent of  n and of temporal goodness at other times. 
 In the total theory, the temporal value functions are the identity function. Other 
additively separable theories have other functions. The “weighted total theory” departs 
from the total theory only by giving different weights to goodnesses at different times: 
 G =  a 1  g 1 +  a 2  g 2 +  a 3  g 3 + . . . +  a  n  g  n  . 
 Here,  a 1 ,  a 2 are constants that specify the weights. If later weights are greater than 
earlier ones, later times in life count for more than earlier ones. One result is that 
a life that improves over time is better than one that deteriorates, if they both have 
the same total of temporal good. well-being. This is a consequence of the weighted 
total theory. 5 By contrast, some authors—generally economist or public health 
analysts—“discount” the qoodness of later times in a life (e.g., Murray 1994). This 
means they give later times less weight than earlier ones. 
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 Another additively separable formula is: 
 G =  v ( g 1 ) +  v ( g 2 ) +  v ( g 3 ) + . . . +  v ( g  n  ). 
 Here all the temporal value functions are the same,  v (). Take the case where  v () 
is an increasing, strictly concave function, which means its graph slopes upward 
but curves downward. Then we may call the theory “prioritarian.” It gives prior-
ity to improving bad times over improving good ones. This has the indirect effect 
of assigning more goodness to a life that has an even tenor than to one that has 
extreme highs and lows, if they both have the same total of temporal good. It gives 
indirect value to evenness, that is to say. 
 5.3 Constant-Length Additively Separable Th eories 
 A different type of theory is the “average theory,” that the goodness of a life is the 
average of its temporal goodnesses. Its goodness function is: 
 G =  g 1 / n +  g 2 / n +  g 3 / n + . . . +  g  n  / n . 
 This theory does not require temporal good to be measured on a ratio scale; a car-
dinal scale is enough. It is one formulation of the view, mentioned in section 1, that 
only the quality of life matters, and not its quantity. 
 The average theory is not additively separable by the definition I gave. It does 
treat the goodness of a life as the sum of values, each of which is assigned to a par-
ticular time and is a function of the temporal goodness of that time. However, the 
form of this function depends on the length of the life  n . 
 When lengthening or shortening the life is not in question, the average theory 
is equivalent to the total theory. Among lives that are all the same length, it orders 
them just as the total theory does. So the average theory is additively separable 
among lives with the same length. 
 But think about extending a life by one time. If the temporal goodness of this time 
is above the average of the existing times, then the life is improved by extending it. If 
it is below, the life is made worse by extending it. So the value of adding an extra time 
depends on the temporal goodness of other times. In this sense the value of this extra 
time is not independent of other times. That is why I do not count the average theory 
as truly additively separable. Instead, I say it is “constant-length additively separable.” 
 Another theory in the same class is: 
 G =  g 1 +  g 2 +  b ( g 2 –  g 1 ) +  g 3 +  b ( g 3 –  g 2 ) + . . . +  g  n  +  b ( g  n  –  g  n –1 ). 
 This theory gives value to improvements in temporal good, as the weighted total 
theory can do, but it does so more directly.  b is the weight assigned to improve-
ments. This goodness function may be rewritten in the form 
G = (1 – b)g1 + g2 + g3 + . . . + (1 + b)gn.
 This makes it look superficially like an instance of the weighted total theory. But 
actually it is not additively separable because the weight given to any particular time 
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depends on whether or not it is the last time. However, this theory is constant-length 
additively separable. 
 5.4 Nonadditively Separable Th eories 
 Some theories are not additively separable at all. Some start out from the total 
theory, and modify it in one way or another, to take account of values it does not 
accommodate. One of these gives value directly to evenness: 
 G =  g 1 +  g 2 +  g 3 + . . . +  g  n  –  cI ( g 1 ,  g 2 ,  g 3 , . . .  g  n  ). 
 I () is some measure of unevenness in the life’s temporal goodnesses; it is a measure 
of inequality among the temporal goodnesses in the life. Various measures could 
be used: the variance, the Gini coefficient, and so on, and  c is a parameter that 
assigns a weight to evenness. This formula values evenness more directly than the 
prioritarian formula does. 
 Other theories of lifetime goodness are much more remote from the total the-
ory, but nevertheless satisfy the assumption of distribution. One is the theory that 
the goodness of a life is given only by how good it is at its end: 
 G =  g  n  
 Another is the theory that the goodness of a life is given by the best time in it: 
 G = max{ g 1 ,  g 2 ,  g 3 , . . .  g  n  } 
 Like the average theory, these theories are alternative expressions of the idea that only 
quality of life matters, and not quantity. They may be combined into the “peak and 
end rule.” 6 Either of them is able to order lives by their goodness so long as temporal 
goodnesses are ordered and comparable between different times. To order lives, neither 
requires a cardinal scale of temporal goodness. However, if the overall goodness of lives 
is to be on a cardinal scale, temporal goodnesses must be on a cardinal scale too. 
 I hope I have given enough examples now to illustrate the range of choice avail-
able among theories of lifetime goodness. 
 6.  Conclusion 
 When you die, what you lose is neither nothing nor everything. It is the rest of 
your life. The badness of this loss is, seen differently, the goodness of rest of your 
life. More accurately, it is the difference between the goodness of the longer life you 
would have led, had you survived, and the shorter life you do lead. So the question 
of how bad is death transmutes into the question of how good is life. 
 I have not tried to answer this latter question, but I have outlined and classified 
some of the answers that are available. 
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 Notes 
 1 .  This is the way adopted by Thomas Nagel, 1970. 
 2 .  For instance, Ben Bradley, 2009, pp. 47–60. 
 3 .  A valuable recent discussion of how this might be done is Wlodek Rabinowicz, 2009. 
 4 .  This view is formalized in something I call “the principle of personal good.” See my 
2004, p. 120. 
 5 .  The view that improvement is good is championed by David Velleman, 1991. 
 6 .  Kahneman, 1999. But note that Kahneman does not favor the peak and end rule as a 
formula for the value of a life. 
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